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Abstract
In September 1931, Sweden became the first country to make the stabilization of the domestic price level
the official goal of its monetary policy, actually the only country that so far has adopted such an explicit
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the 1990s of inflation targeting - as contrasted to price level targeting - this paper examines the evolution
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Pioneering Price Level Targeting: the Swedish Experience 1931-1937
1. Introduction
1
Late in the evening of Sunday September 27th 1931, the Swedish Minister of Finance announced on
behalf of the Government that the Riksbank was relieved from its legal obligation to convert its notes into
gold on demand. After explaining the developments leading to this step, the Minister stated that the policy
of the Riksbank should "now be aimed at, using all means available, preserving the domestic purchasing
power of the Swedish krona."
By this statement Sweden became the first country to make the stabilization of the level of domestic prices
the official goal of its monetary policy; actually the only country that did so in the interwar period.
According to contemporary economists, Sweden adopted Knut Wicksell's program of price stabilization.
In modern parlance, the Riksbank became the first central bank to introduce price level targeting
explicitly. To our knowledge it remains the only central bank that has taken such a step so far.
This paper analyzes the evolution of the Swedish experiment of price level targeting in the 1930s.
2 The
paper is organized in the following way. First, we explain why price level stabilization was made the
norm for monetary policy by accounting for the events leading up to the September 1931 declaration.
Second, following a brief account of Swedish economic performance in the 1930s, we account for the
development of the monetary program of September 1931 from its start until 1937. Finally, we conclude.
The recent international experience of inflation targeting - as contrasted to price level targeting - is the
main source of inspiration for our study.
3 We thus base our analysis on issues and concepts familiar from
present research and debate on the proper conduct of central bank policy. Consequently, we look upon the
                                                       
1 We would like to thank Klas Fregert, Carl-Göran Lemne and Lars Svensson for constructive suggestions. Jesper Hansson
and Lena Lindhe has skillfully assisted with the construction of the charts. We also thank Ann-Christine Högberg för
secretarial and editorial assistance.
2 The term experiment pertaining to the monetary program was used by Ohlin (1933, 1934) and Lester (1939) among
others in the 1930s.
3 For surveys on the inflation targeting of the 1990s see Haldane (1995), Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Bernanke
and Mishkin (1997) among others.4
Swedish experiment of price level targeting in the 1930s from the perspective of the experience of
inflation targeting in the 1990s.
4
A price stability target can serve as a nominal anchor, aiming at coordinating inflation expectations as
well as providing a commitment mechanism to avoid the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy,
see e.g. Mishkin (1998). The modern view on optimal delegation of monetary policy may be summarized
in three recommendations. First, the political authorities should define a clear goal for monetary policy,
preferably price stability. This goal should be given a legal backing. Second, the central bank should be
given operational independence in order to be able to fulfil the goal assigned by the political authorities.
Third, the central bank should be held accountable to the political bodies for the conduct of monetary
policy.
When discussing Swedish monetary policy in the 1930s we are interested in a number of issues associated
with the modern view on monetary policy and central banking. Which body introduced the target for
monetary policy? How was price stability defined by the Swedish authorities? Which price indices were
used? How was the target date set?  Was the Riksbank given operational independence? Which was the
role of public announcements to influence expectations by the public? Were there any changes in central
bank legislation? Did monetary aggregates play a role? How was the program of price stabilization
monitored by the parliament and other observers? Was the Riksbank held accountable for the behavior of
prices and other economic variables? Are there any lessons for the implementation of inflation targeting
today?  Is there anything essential in today's inflation targeting that was overlooked by the Riksbank in
the 1930s?
In our opinion, the 1930s was a period of trial-and-error in monetary policy framing involving the
Riksbank, the Banking Committee of the Parliament (the Riksdag), the Government, more precisely the
Ministry of Finance, and the economics profession as well as other actors  - quite so because the
Riksbank and its principal, the Riksdag, had no previous experience of price level targeting. Being
pioneers in this field, the monetary authorities had to learn how to design a policy of price stabilization.
The Swedish experience of price stabilization in the 1930s may therefore also be related to the recent
literature on learning processes and changes in monetary policy regimes, as well as to the literature on
                                                       
4 The Swedish monetary program of the 1930s as well as the work on monetary rules by Swedish economists like Knut
Wicksell, David Davidson and Erik Lindahl attracted a considerable interest internationally in the 1930s. See Fisher (1935,
1937) and Lester (1939) among others. It was "rediscovered" as part of the impact of monetarism and monetary history in
the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) spirit in the 1970s, see Jonung (1979b) and (1981). The present debate on inflation
targeting and on rules versus discretion has contributed to a new interest in the Swedish 1930s. See for example Johnson
and Keleher (1996).5
inflation targeting.
5 Our account demonstrates how new problems, new events, new policy priorities and
new theories concerning monetary and fiscal policies induced policy-makers to adjust and develop the
monetary program of 1931 and - eventually  - to incorporate it into a broad program of stabilization
policy.
2. The adoption of the monetary program of price stabilization 1931-32
2.1. Forces behind the adoption
Why was price stabilization adopted as the guide for Swedish monetary policy in 1931? Two major forces
were at work here: first, the influence of the economics profession on policy-makers due to its strong
position in Swedish society, and, second the monetary experience of World War I and the 1920s of high
inflation and sharp deflation as interpreted by contemporary observers.
The academic economists provided the major source of inspiration. In 1898 Knut Wicksell gave a talk at
a meeting of the Swedish Economic Association presenting for the first time his view that price level
stabilization should be the proper aim of central bank policy. Wicksell founded his policy
recommendation on the theoretical work of his German tract  Geldzins und Güterpreise, translated into
English as Interest and Prices, Wicksell (1965).
Wicksell's rule for the conduct of monetary policy was a simple one: the central bank should raise its
discount rate as long as prices were rising, lower it as long as prices were falling and keep it constant
when the price level was stable. The key to price stabilization was thus found in the discount rate. This
was the essence of the "cumulative process" as Wicksell's theory was later termed. Price stabilization was
thus accomplished by interest rate policy. Monetary aggregates like the volume of credit, the monetary
base, bank reserves or the stock of money did not play any major role in this framework. In addition,
Wicksell's scheme required a "free standard", that is a monetary system based on an inconvertible paper
standard.
                                                       
5 See King (1996), Bordo and Jonung (1998) and Sargent (1998). Sargent suggests an alternative to delegating monetary
policy to an independent central bank with a legislated price stability goal. An adaptive model may open the way for a
government to learn from past attempts to exploit the Phillips curve thereby eventually discovering a version of the natural
rate hypothesis that instructs it to reduce inflation. See also Jonung (1998) examining the evolution of Swedish stabilization
policies 1970-1995 as a short-sighted learning process based on negative learning.6
Wicksell's proposal met hardly with any interest during the classical gold standard prior to the outbreak of
war in 1914. David Davidson was the exception. In an academic exchange, reviewing  Geldzins und
Güterpreise in Ekonomisk Tidskrift, Davidson challenged Wicksell's norm of monetary policy, proposing
that prices should fall in proportion to the growth in productivity. Wicksell replied but no consensus
emerged on this matter. Rather, the two proposals have remained contestants in Swedish monetary debate
since then. Later, Erik Lindahl became an ardent proponent of Davidson's norm which he elaborated on in
the 1920s.
6
Sweden followed the international pattern of leaving the gold standard at the outbreak of World War I. A
paper standard was introduced and high inflation occurred, primarily at the end of the war. In the early
1920s a return to the gold standard at the prewar gold parity became the official goal of monetary policy,
requiring a sharp deflation. The subsequent fall in prices contributed to a rapid rise in unemployment,
huge output losses and social unrest.
As a result of the sharp fluctuations in Swedish prices, unemployment and production, the discussion of
the policy of the Riksbank became exceedingly lively in the years prior to the re-establishment of the gold
standard in the 1920s. Because of this exchange of ideas on monetary policy - to which the economists as
well as representatives from the Riksbank  and business contributed - the Swedish public became well
acquainted with various monetary norms.
The economists held a strong position in public debate, highly respected and successful in a way difficult
to apprehend today.
7 Gustav Cassel had his greatest impact in the 1920s, being regarded as the most
influential economist in the world before being eclipsed by John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s.
8 An
American observer noted that the Swedish public became "price-level minded" due to the energetic
journalistic activity of the economists.
9 The strong position of the economics profession eventually paved
the way for the adoption of the monetary program of 1931.
The second major force accounting for the price stabilization program was the monetary experience of the
1920s. Most Swedish economists were in favor of a return to the gold standard at the prewar parity in the
early 1920s. They simply could not envisage the deep depression, the output losses and the rise of
                                                       
6 For a modern interpretation of Lindahl´s views see Fregert (1993).
7 The lively journalistic activities of the first generation of Swedish economists are described in Magnusson (1993).
8 Cassel's address to the US Congress in 1927 is often regarded as the zenith of his career.
9 See Lester (1939, p. 226), where he also stated: "In Sweden academic economists probably enjoy more respect and
influence with the people and the government than anywhere else in the world."7
unemployment associated with the deflation process. In addition, unemployment remained at a high and
persistent level throughout the 1920s. These events undermined the legitimacy of the gold standard and
opened for a discussion of alternative monetary arrangements and policy norms. Swedish economists,
notably Gustav Cassel, once a supporter of the gold standard, became critical of the workings of the
interwar gold standard.
The world-wide depression starting in 1928 and manifested in falling prices and rising unemployment
undermined the standing of the gold standard within academic circles in Sweden. When the depression hit
Sweden in 1931 the ground was laid for the acceptance of alternatives to the gold standard. The
depression became in this way a window of opportunity for the proponents of price stabilization.
2.2. The program of 1931
The full impact of the depression hit Sweden in 1931 through falling exports and a drain on its foreign
reserves. Bank failures in Central Europe contributed to capital outflows from Sweden. When the Bank of
England made its notes inconvertible to gold on September 19, 1931, speculators attacked the krona. In
the following week the foreign holdings of the Riksbank declined rapidly. The Riksbank tried to obtain
long term financing from New York and Paris to stay on gold but failed.
As a consequence of the speculative attack, the Board of the Riksbank asked at the end of the week the
Government for permission to make Riksbank notes inconvertible into gold, evoking the escape clause in
the constitution. The escape clause, as amended in 1915 after the gold suspension of 1914, allowed the
Riksbank to suspend the gold convertibility of its notes in case of "severe money crises".
10 11
In anticipation of the request by the Board, the Minister of Finance, Mr Felix Hamrin, turned to Gustav
Cassel on Saturday September 26 asking him to prepare a statement concerning the monetary position of
Sweden to be used by the Government. Cassel accepted this task, toiling with it into the night, sending his
proposal to Hamrin by messenger late Saturday.
                                                       
10 From 1931 until 1974, the Riksdag granted annually the Riksbank exception from the requirement of redeeming its notes
into gold. In 1974 the constitution was changed, cutting the link between gold and Riksbank notes. This step marked the
end of the gold standard in Sweden from a purely legalistic point of view. See Fregert and Jonung (1996).
11 The gold suspension of 1931 was the first and only occasion when the notes of the Riksbank were made inconvertible in
a legal sense; all other suspensions have been illegal. See Fregert and Jonung (1996).8
On Sunday September 27 the Government met to decide on the request of the Board of the Riksbank.
Basically, it had no choice but to allow the Riksbank to leave the gold standard as the foreign reserves
were depleted. In the declaration made public Sunday evening, the Minister of Finance, Felix Hamrin,
first explained the chain of events leading to the decision of gold suspension. He put the blame on foreign
developments and argued that the public finances of Sweden were in good order.
At the end of the declaration, the monetary program of price stabilization was announced; the domestic
purchasing of the krona should be preserved "using all means available".
12 Apparently it was an
economist, Gustav Cassel, who was instrumental in putting price stabilization into the announcement of
the Swedish government demonstrating the influence of the economics profession on policy-making.
13
2.3. The program of 1932
The new monetary policy goal was covered by one sentence in the declaration of September 27th, 1931,
Thus, it was far from a complete program for monetary policy. It became the starting point for eight
months of deliberations by the Board of the Riksbank, the work of three eminent monetary economists
and the Banking Committee of the Riksdag which was supervising the Riksbank, and public debate on
monetary issues, before a more developed program was finally confirmed by the Riksdag (the Parliament)
in May 1932. It may be summarized in five major points:
1) An immediate return to gold or a peg to the British pound should not to be considered, that is Sweden
should maintain a flexible exchange rate for the krona for the time being. Efforts to control the value of
the krona should start from the domestic price level and the "needs of Sweden's economy".
2) Continued deflation should be resisted just as strongly as the inflation was resisted that was expected
when Sweden abandoned the gold standard.
3) Some recovery in prices would be desirable, though not a return to a "too distant" price level. Even
domestic prices should be allowed to rise, not just export and import prices, provided this did not
appreciably affect the cost of living. Price increases due to higher custom duties should be accepted as
consistent with the monetary program.
4) Monetary policy should not be tied schematically to a particular index figure. Conducting monetary
policy in the interest of the entire country involved considering so many factors that "a formal and simple
rule" for monetary policy did not appear feasible.
                                                       
12 Record of financial matters, done before the King-in-Council at Stockholm Palace on 27th September 1931.
13 The above description is taken from the autobiography by Cassel (1941, p 285). Cassel noted that Hamrin did not show
him any appreciation for this work. We cannot rule out that Hamrin used other advisors as well. Lester (1937, 1939) stated
that Heckscher prepared Hamrin's statement. Most likely, Hamrin was influenced by both Cassel and Heckscher. The full
account of the monetary program of 1931 remains to be written.9
5) It was generally desirable that domestic interest rates were kept as low as was conceivably possible
without jeopardizing the monetary policy objective.
In June 1933 the Riksdag approved a revised version of the monetary program. The major additional
recommendation was stated in the following way:
6) The choice of means for reaching the monetary policy objective should rest entirely with the Riksbank,
and the Riksbank should be allowed such liberty of action as is required for this purpose.
3. Swedish Economic Performance in the 1930s
As the monetary program as well as the evaluation of the program evolved was strongly influenced by
actual economic events, we describe briefly the behavior of some major economic aggregates such as
prices, interest rates, exchange rates, unemployment and production in the 1930s prior to World War II.
This account of the depression in Sweden serves as a background for the subsequent analysis of the
evolution of the program of price stabilization.
Prices. A major part of the contemporary discussion of the monetary program focussed on two price
indices and their relationship: the consumer price index of the Riksbank that the Bank started to compile
in the fall of 1931 and the whole-sale price index available from World War I. These indices, displayed in
Chart 1 for the period 1928-1938 with September 1931 as the base equal to 100, show roughly the same
long-run pattern, falling from 1928 until 1932-33 and then turning upwards. (The consumer price index is
proxied by the cost-of-living index for 1928-30 in Chart 1.) The secular fall and rise in consumer prices,
however, is much smaller than the movements in wholesale prices.
Wholesale prices fell sharply from January 1928 to September 1931, reflecting the effects of the
international deflation transmitted to Sweden through the workings of the interwar gold standard. The
deflationary process was halted by Sweden leaving the gold standard and adopting a "free" standard in
September 1931 - just as envisaged in Hamrin's  declaration of September 27th, 1931. Wholesale prices
subsequently remained roughly constant, with a minor decline, until the spring of 1933. From then on
they began a gradual rise, accelerating in 1936-37, then falling in 1937-38.
The consumer price index exhibited, judging from Chart 1, a stable long-run pattern. Consumer prices
declined on average in 1931-33 followed by a gradual rise from then on. The index fluctuated
considerably less than wholesale prices within a band of less than 3 percentage points around the base10
level of 100 for September 1931 during the period 1931-36. During 1937 consumer prices rose by almost
5 per cent. Then the CPI remained stable prior to the outbreak of World War II.
The rate of change in the two price indices, shown in Chart 2, demonstrates that wholesale prices
exhibited greater volatility than consumer prices. It also indicates that price stabilization as carried out by
the Riksbank was not identical to a zero rate of consumer price inflation in the 1930s on a monthly basis.
These movements in consumer and wholesale prices were influencing the design of the monetary program
as well as the actions of the Riksbank as seen below.
Exchange rates. Contemporary commentators on monetary matters paid much attention to the behavior of
exchange rates. Actually, the protocols from the meetings of the Board of the Bank reveal that the Bank
was preoccupied primarily by the behavior of the pound rate but also of the dollar rate. The pound rate, as
shown in chart 3, fell below the gold parity rate of 18.15 kronor during the fall of 1931. It rose sharply
above the gold parity rate at the news of  the death of Ivar Kreuger in early March 1932, declining in the
Fall of 1932. After a rise in the Spring of 1933, the Riksbank pegged the krona to the pound in July
1933. The peg was maintained until the outbreak of World War II, signifying Sweden´s adherence to the
Sterling bloc that evolved after the gold suspension of 1931 by the Bank of England.
14
The dollar rate rose sharply after Sweden left gold, reached a peak in the Fall of 1932 and fell back almost
to the gold parity level after the US left the gold standard in the Spring of 1933. The krona remained then
depreciated relative to the currencies that were on gold.
Interest rates. Swedish interest rates followed relatively closely the UK rate as seen from  Chart 4. When
the link between the krona and gold was severed in September 1931, the Riksbank raised its discount rate
from six  to eight per cent out of fear of inflation. It was subsequently lowered, albeit at a slower pace
than the UK rate, reaching 2,5 per cent in 1934 where it remained until the outbreak of World War II.
Unemployment and production. The rate of unemployment rose sharply starting in 1930-31, peaking in
the Spring of 1933, see chart 5. Unemployment remained high, although falling, during the 1930s.
Production, in particular within the export sector, declined sharply during the depression. Real income fell
in absolute terms during two years, 1932 and 1933.
                                                       
14 The Scandinavian countries as well as members of the British empire among other countries belonged to the Sterling bloc
or Sterling area in the 1930s.11
Compared to most other countries, in particular those that stayed on gold, the Swedish economy fared
relatively well during the 1930s.
15 While industrial production, as shown in chart 6, in Sweden fell by 21
per cent in 1929-32, the decline in the US was 46 per cent. The corresponding numbers for the decline in
real income are 9 and 22 percent, respectively.
16 The Swedish recovery 1933-38 was remarkably strong as
well.
4. The Evolution of the Monetary Program 1931-37
The Riksbank was facing a new task after the gold suspension in September 1931; that of implementing a
program of price stabilization. It had no prior experience, nor any foreign examples to use as guidance. It
simply lacked knowledge about the proper conduct of monetary policy under a "free standard" – as
Swedish commentators described the new monetary regime. At the suggestion of Ivar Rooth, the Governor
of the Riksbank, the Board of Directors decided on October 8, 1931 to turn to three renowned economists
for advice, Gustav Cassel, David Davidson and Eli Heckscher.
The inquiry of the Riksbank dealt with many questions sorted under three major headings: first, the proper
choice of monetary standard for Sweden and the transition to such a standard, second, the proper set of
instruments (or means) for monetary policy, and third and finally, any other issues deemed important for
the future organization of the monetary system of Sweden.  (The questionnaire is displayed in Table A1 in
Appendix A.) As the recommendations, given in three separate reports, of the three economists covered
most of the issues that were debated subsequently, they are used here as the starting point for our account
of the evolution of the monetary program. In addition, the reports most likely influenced the Riksbank  in
the 1930s. The views of  the economists, in particular those of Cassel and Heckscher, were also made
known to the public through newspaper articles and other contributions.
As seen from the following account the Riksbank should properly be described as an independent central
bank towards the Government in the 1930s.
17 The Riksbank was the bank of the Parliament since 1668
when it was taken over from private interests. The Parliament has throughout history tried to protect the
Riksbank from attempts by the executive branch to take control over monetary policy.  Since the
                                                       
15 This is a common pattern during the 1930s; countries leaving gold early were hit less severe by the depression. See for
example Eichengreen (1992) and Bernanke (1995).
16 See Table 1 in Jonung (1981).
17  The independence of the Riksbank in the 18
th and 19
th century is examined in Fregert and Jonung (1996) and in the 20
th
century in Haavisto and Jonung (1998).12
introduction of the gold standard in the 1870s, monetary policy was solely a matter for the Riksbank,
which strengthened the independence of the Riksbank.  The Riksbank was headed by the Board of the
Riksbank which met weekly. The Board was mainly made up of members of the Parliament, who had no
major interest in the daily conduct of the business of the Bank. The Governor of the Riksbank thus held a
strong position within the Board.
As mentioned in the introduction, the following description of the evolution of the monetary program in
the period 1931-37 is inspired by a number of issues of the present debate on inflation targeting. We
examine the views put forth by the Banking Committee of the Riksdag, that supervised the Riksbank, the
Board of the Riksbank, the Minster of Finance, the economists and the governor of the Riksbank, Ivar
Rooth.
4.1. Was the shift to price level targeting a permanent or a temporary one?
In the 1990s the adoption of inflation targets in several countries has been announced as a permanent shift
of the monetary policy regime, commonly as a reaction of disappointment with the macroeconomic
performance of the old regime. Inflation targeting thus represents a move from regimes based on fixed
exchange rates, monetary targeting or high inflation to a regime of low inflation or price stability as
defined as inflation within a range from zero to 3 percent annual inflation. Much effort has been spent at
creating credibility for the new regime of inflation targeting and reduce expectations of return to high
inflation.
18
The introduction of the price level target in 1931 was initially viewed as a temporary - not a permanent -
step by the Swedish policy authorities. When the Minister of Finance announced the new monetary policy
goal on 27 September 1931, he declared that the divorce from gold was not to be a permanent one. On the
contrary, a return to gold should be aimed for as soon as the conditions for this were at hand.
19
About a month later in their replies to the questionnaire of the Riksbank on the future monetary
arrangement of the krona, Cassel, Davidson and Heckscher were of the same opinion.
                                                       
18 See for example the contributions in Leiderman and Svensson (1995) on the inflation targeting in five countries.
19 Record of financial matters, done before the King-in-Council at Stockholm Palace on 27th September 1931.13
The three economists recommended that Sweden should maintain a “free standard” based on price
stabilization as long as the world monetary system remained disorganized. There should be a rapid and
immediate return at existing exchange rates to a gold standard or to an international monetary system,
once international monetary stability had been restored. Initially, they viewed the monetary program of
1931 as a temporary arrangement while the world monetary system was in disarray.
The permanence of the program was considered a few months later by the  Banking Committee in
February 1932:
"It would, of course, be desirable to be able to draw up a program for the Riksbank's monetary policy that
gained as much universal applicability as possible and could apply for a considerable time. But in view of
the many elements of uncertainty that still pertain in the situation and the domestic situation's dependence
on what may occur abroad, it should be pointed out that  at present any monetary policy program must
be said to apply only for the time being. In the opinion of the Governing Board, the time has not yet
come to establish a program for the longer term, constituting guidelines for safeguarding a stabilised
currency."
20
The Banking Committee declared in May 1932:
"Monetary policy since the departure from the gold standard and the Governing Board's actions to
maintain the value of the currency seem to call for more detailed treatment, considering for instance that
the statements, with which the Government concurs in these respects, could  no doubt acquire the
character of guidelines for our monetary policy in the immediate future ."
21
As the international gold standard gradually dissolved in the 1930s, a return to gold became no longer a
viable alternative for Sweden. Instead, the monetary program was maintained and gradually amended in
various ways. Some economists actually started to view it as the first step towards a Swedish as well as
international adoption of price stabilization as the proper norm for monetary policy - as an alternative to
fixed exchange rate systems. This was the case of Irving Fisher (1934) and Erik Lindahl (1937).
However, a younger group of Swedish economists, working within the Stockholm School approach,
started to question the price stabilization program on theoretical as well as empirical grounds, eventually
suggesting employment stabilization as a superior goal to price stabilization as seen below.
To sum up, the monetary program of 1931 was initially viewed as a temporary one by the government, the
economists and the Riksbank. A return to a fixed exchange rate was regarded as the natural step, in
particular by the Riksbank. The Riksbank tried unsuccessfully such a return already in November 1931 by
                                                       
20 Banking Committee, Submission 6, February 1932, p. 3, italics are ours.
21 Banking Committee, Submission no. 40, May 1932, p. 15, italics are ours.14
pegging the krona to the pound at the old gold parity rate. The Riksbank made a new attempt in July 1933
that lasted until the outbreak of World War II. See Chart 3.
4.2. How was price stabilization defined?
In the 1990s all countries pursuing an explicit price stability target have chosen an explicit quantitative
inflation target, either an interval or a point target, where the center of the interval or the point target
varies across countries from 1.5 to 2.5 per cent per year. The target, thus, is set in terms of a rate change
rather than of the price level. Several recent papers present arguments for preferring a target in terms of
levels rather than rates of change, however.
22
The price stability target adopted by the Riksbank in 1931-32 was a price level target, in contrast to the
inflation target adopted by central banks in the 1990s. A price level target implies that a lower than target
inflation rate in one period has to be offset by a correspondingly higher inflation rate in the following
period. An inflation target allows ”base drift” in the price level: after each period, the actual price level is
taken as the base for the inflation target of the next period, even if the inflation target for the base period
was not met.
When the Finance Minister announced that monetary policy should be directed at "preserving the
domestic purchasing power of the Swedish krona" in September 1931, he wanted to arrest the ongoing
deflation as well as calm fears of inflation judging from contemporary comments. It was left to others to
choose the norm consistent with "stable domestic purchasing power". From a Swedish point of view, two
alternatives existed: either the norm of Wicksell, that is of a stable price level, or the norm of Davidson,
that is a falling price level proportional to productivity growth. Both norms consistent with the concept of
"price stabilization" – just as a low rate of inflation today is consistent with the concept of “price
stabilization”.
Which should be the future behavior of the price level once the monetary program was in force? This was
the principal issue of monetary policy under an independent standard according to  Heckscher's report to
the Riksbank. He favored the norm developed by Davidson and later by Lindahl of a price level varying
inversely with the growth in productivity. However, Hecksher felt the problem of choosing the proper
norm was so complicated that the Riksbank should seek the advice of those who had studied it in great
detail.
                                                       
22 See Fischer (1994), Goodhart and Vinals (1994), Dugay (1994) and Svensson (1997).15
In his report, Cassel argued that Sweden must have an independently managed paper standard and that
there could hardly be any other norm for this standard than the stabilization of the domestic purchasing
power of the krona. He stated that the great advantage of the paper standard was that Sweden became
isolated from the "destructive" deflation taking place in those countries still on gold. This ability of the
paper standard to prevent the world deflation from spreading to Sweden should be regarded as the main
reason why Sweden left the gold standard. According to Cassel, this goal had to be determined by the use
of a quantitative measure of the purchasing power of the krona. His report suggests that Wicksell's norm
should be adopted although he was not explicit on this issue.
Davidson considered two competing monetary norms for a free currency: first, a stable general price level,
and second, a norm that - judging from his argument - was most likely the norm presently carrying his
name. The first norm had the advantage of being simple and easy to follow for the monetary authorities
although it was not the correct guideline for monetary policy in Davidson's opinion.
23
The three economists all agreed that monetary policy under a paper standard should be focused solely on
price stabilization. They did not consider any other goals for the Riksbank such as output or employment
stabilization in their reports although written when Swedish industrial production was declining and
unemployment was rising dramatically.
Judging from the official documents on monetary policy during the subsequent years, price stabilization
was eventually defined as price level targeting. In April 1932 the Governing Board of the Riksbank stated
that it was expected that in the first place, as in other countries, the departure from the gold standard
would start a process of  inflation. The declared monetary policy program was " intended to calm such
fears". On the other hand, the Board said, "the program was intended  to prevent the price level in
Sweden from following the downward international price trend".
24
In May 1932, the Banking Committee considered the criticism that had been directed at the monetary
policy program. On the one hand there had been fairly sharp criticism of the Riksbank's interest rate
policy and its credit restrictions, which had been considered to impose excessively heavy burdens on the
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economy and had been interpreted as representing a deflationary price policy. On the other hand, the
starting point for monetary policy had been the desirability of keeping the cost of living largely
unchanged. At the same time, however, it had been admitted that the sharp price fall had had harmful
effects and the intention had not been to oppose a recovery of the wholesale price level, which for
producers was considered of primary importance, provided this recovery was kept within the bounds that
would be controllable for monetary policy instruments and did not entail an appreciable increase in living
costs.
It appeared to the Banking Committee that the opinions which were put forward from various quarters did
not differ so appreciably either from each other or from the program in question—particularly as this was
propounded in the Governing Board's document dated 11 February 1932 — that these opinions could not
be reconciled with the broad guidelines that were incorporated in the program. The Committee considered
that this would no doubt be the case under two conditions: that the Governing Board's statement is
elaborated so that an "equally strong defence is set up against continued deflation as against an
originally feared inflation and that the price recovery referred to is  not envisaged as a return to an
unduly distant price level."
25
The Banking Committee also considered in May 1932 that the starting point for efforts to control the
value of the krona should be "the domestic price level and the needs of  Sweden´s economy ".26 But from
this it did not follow that the program to maintain the domestic purchasing power of the Swedish krona
could constitute the sole foundation for these efforts. Neither did the purport of this program by itself
appear to be so unmistakable that it could be accepted without further ado as a principle for monetary
policy in the near future.
To sum up, price stabilization was eventually regarded as synonymous with Knut Wicksell´s norm.
4.3. Which price index was used as target variable?
In the 1990s all countries where monetary policy today is based on an explicit, quantitative inflation
target, have chosen the consumer price index (CPI) or a variant of this that excludes volatile components
as the target variable. In some countries the target variable disregards effects of political decisions (taxes
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and subsidies) or monetary policy decisions. Alternatively, a number of factors that should be disregarded
in evaluations of the target variable are specified in advance.
27
In the 1930s the Swedish authorities was facing the choice of proper price index to select as target
variable for the new monetary program. In his reply to the Riksbank questionnaire,  Heckscher's choice
was the price of goods domestically produced. As a matter of principle the Riksbank could stabilize an
average price level consisting of exports, imports and non-tradable domestic goods. In the prevailing
situation this would, however, be to ask "too much" of monetary policy.
According to Cassel, the choice was between the stabilization of either the wholesale prices or of the cost
of living. Cassel argued that a stabilization of the cost of living would be favorably received by the
general public. He also suggested that a "broader" measure of the purchasing power of the krona than the
cost-of-living index should be, preferably computed on a weekly basis. Furthermore, the Bank should
adopt this general index as a guide for its policy, paying attention to indices for separate groups of goods
only under "special circumstances".
Concerning the selection of price index to be used by the Bank,  Davidson suggested that "due attention"
should be given to every kind of index since so little was presently known about this issue. He advised the
Bank to explain in great detail how its price index was constructed because such knowledge would
facilitate an analysis of actual price movements. The Bank ought to use its price data for two purposes,
first, and most importantly, to measure the impact of monetary policy and, second, to inform the Bank
about future developments, that is to use it as an indicator.
The Riksbank started to calculate a consumer price index on a weekly basis after the announcement of the
price stabilization norm in the autumn of 1931. The consumer price index was constructed at the
statistical department at the Riksbank with the assistance by the board of trade and the Royal Social
Board.
28 See Chart 1 and Chart 2.
The aim of the Riksbank index was to register at short intervals in the most generally comprehensible and
widely applicable way possible the influence of Swedish monetary policy with regard to the internal
purchasing power of the krona, for the information both of the directors of the Bank of Sweden and the
Swedish public.
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A weekly table of the whole commodity price system, a weekly index of the average retail prices of
consumer goods and of services were produced. The index number was calculated to detect as far as
possible both the origin of price changes and their importance for agriculture and industry. By comparing
various quotations it was possible to decide how far an internal price movement was dependent upon
foreign price changes or an alteration in the exchange rate, and to what extent it was founded on internal
conditions, for example, on a change in domestic demand. Data were assembled from fifteen localities to
show the retail price of  goods and services, which were considered representative of consumption within
the entire country.
The index was subject to a constant process of re-sampling so as to adjust it to fundamental changes
taking place in the commodity and service markets. The components of the index were thus altered as the
need for change arose. The weighting of each component part was changed from time to time so as to
reflect, as far as feasible, the direction of effective consumer demand.
However, the Board of the Riksbank did not tie monetary policy solely to its consumer price index. In
February 1932, the Board of the Riksbank pointed out that when forming its policy in view of fluctuations
in the price level the Riksbank could not but take into account the causes of such changes in prices. It was
considered essential to determine whether price movements were caused, e.g., by increased tariffs, altered
exchange rates or a tendency to inflation on the domestic market which could be looked upon as primary
in relation to exchange rates. In any such analysis of price conditions, naturally " other price indices
besides the Riksbank’s own index of consumer prices will also be taken into consideration ."
29
The citation above clearly indicates that the Board did not want the price norm to be formulated only in
terms of the CPI-index. The explicit role of indirect taxes when calculating the index figures was also
taken into consideration. For example, in May 1932, the Governing Board noted:
"That the course of registered price movements has followed the Board's guidelines should be evident
from the appended table showing the Riksbank's consumer price index. Since December 1931 this index
has risen 1.1 per cent, of which about  0.66 percentage points can be considered to have been
occasioned by increased customs and excise duties. "
30
According to Lindahl, allowable divergences were alterations in indirect taxation, seasonal price changes
and other changes of the consumption price level which were not conditional upon the construction of the
index number but were of a more fundamental character.
31 The Board of the Riksbank also said that, in
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their endeavor to create as stable economic conditions as possible, it was also taking into account other
factors than mere changes in the price level, particularly conditions affecting productivity and stocks in
various industries.
Finally, the Banking Committee, in May 1932, formulated the part of the program concerning monetary
policy indices, that was to be accepted by the Parliament:
"In this context it should be underscored  that monetary policy should not be rigidly bound by a
particular index figure, neither did the Governing Board appear to intend this. In the endeavor to
conduct monetary policy in the interest of the entire country , so many factors have to be considered
that one can hardly have a simple and formal rule . Under these circumstances the Committee ... states
that the program in question should provide scope for conducting a monetary policy that admits a
reasonable recovery of prices while creating safeguards against the dangers associated with inflation in the
accepted sense of this term."
32
To conclude: On the recommendation of the economists, the Riksbank constructed a consumer price index
in order to analyze at short intervals (it was a weekly index) the influence of monetary policy on the
internal purchasing power of the krona.  This index enabled the public as well as the directors of the Bank
to draw their conclusions as to the future development of the price level as stressed by Davidson and
Heckscher.
33 The Riksbank also monitored the wholesale price indices published by the commercial banks
and the Royal Board of Trade, as well as the price series relating to raw materials. The Riksbank was
concerned with temporary factors, like indirect taxes, and seasonal effects, influencing the development of
inflation. In many ways, the discussion in 1931-32 is a forerunner to the analysis of measures of
underlying rate of inflation in countries pursuing an inflation target strategy today.
4.4. At which level and date should price stabilization start?
In January 1993 when the Riksbank announced its adoption of an inflation target, it also declared a
transition period of two years by stating that the inflation target was to be effective starting in January
1995
34. The Riksbank specified that the objective of monetary policy is to limit the annual increase in the
consumer price index in 1995 and onwards to 2 per cent, with a degree of tolerance of  – 1 per cent. This
objective corresponded to the underlying rate of inflation when the target was announced. In 1993 and
1994 monetary was to aim at preventing the inflationary impulse due to the depreciation of the krona and
changes in indirect taxes from causing an increase in the underlying rate of inflation. Thus the Riksbank
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did not suggest a particular level of the CPI as the starting point of inflation targeting, it referred rather to
the underlying inflation as a form of a nominal anchor during the interim period.
In September 1931 when the krona was taken off gold, prices had been falling since 1928 - see Chart 1.
The discussion therefore centered around the issue of an appropriate level at which prices should be
stabilized. A major question was the following one: which point of time should be chosen as the base for
the program of price stabilization? Heckscher settled for the average price level of the third quarter of
1931. He argued that a return to the price level of 1928-29 - before the fall in prices - was not to be
recommended on two counts; first,  the inflation required for such a purpose would create requests for
higher nominal wages, perhaps giving rise to an increasing real wage, second,  and most important, it was
extremely difficult to manage a free standard when prices were rising since rising prices would
contributed to speculation.
Should monetary policy aim at changing the relationship between various indices, particularly between
the wholesale price index and the cost-of-living index? (Chart 2 shows a more rapid fall in wholesale
prices than in the cost of living index.)  Heckscher answered in the negative. As monetary policy could not
do anything in this field, the Riksbank should ignore any disparate movements of individual indices in the
past. This recommendation did not mean that the present relationship between the cost-of-living and
wholesale price index was the desirable or the proper one - only that it was not the task of monetary
policy to make such adjustments according to Heckscher.
Cassel believed that the "normal equilibrium" between these two price indices did not exist at present.
Cassel argued that a stabilization of the cost of living at the level prevailing in mid-1931 would be
favorably received by the general public. In Cassel's opinion, wholesale prices and the cost of living price
index had to converge before any stabilization could take place. He stressed that the wholesale price index
had declined by 25.6 per cent from the average level of 1928 to July 1931 while the cost-of-living index
had declined by only 8.7 per cent  in the same period. A slight rise in wholesale prices was the best way to
accomplish convergence between the two series, as a lowering of the cost of living would reduce nominal
wage rates and cause social unrest. Thereafter a stabilization of the cost of living at the level prevailing in
mid-1931 would be preferable, according to Cassel.  Davidson gave no advice on this matter.
The relationship between wholesale and consumer prices as discussed by the economists remained an
issue throughout the 1930s. In January 1932 the  Finance Minister repeated that the aim should still be to21
maintain the purchasing power of the krona. However, he also noted that "this, of course , does not
preclude certain modifications of prices, especially wholesale prices ."
35
In February 1932, after having pointed out that the retail price level had remained unaltered since
September the Board of the Riksbank added that
 "the Riksbank was not aiming at maintaining unaltered the average retail price level for all consumer
goods". 
36 Through the rise in the prices of certain import and export goods, which was expected
gradually to be more and more strongly reflected in the retail market, such a monetary policy would
necessitate a corresponding forcing down of the prices  of home-market goods — a development that
would intensify the crisis in Sweden.
The Riksbank’s intention was to endeavor to maintain more or less unaltered the average level of prices of
home-market goods and of the most important services that form an integral part of consumption. A
monetary policy along these lines was said to be compatible with a certain rise in the Riksbank’s index,
viz. insofar as it might be caused by a rise in import and export prices brought about by a rise in exchange
rates and in commodity prices abroad.
In May 1932 the Banking Committee added that
"even prices for genuinely domestic products should evidently be allowed to rise, provided this does
not appreciably affect living costs."
37
This statement together with the idea, also added by the Banking Committee, namely that it  was generally
desirable that domestic interest rates were kept as low as was conceivably possible without jeopardizing
the monetary policy objective
38, can be seen as an attempt to reduce the commitment to price stability.
However, in the perspective of the world-wide depression and ongoing deflation in many countries at the
time when the Swedish monetary program was prepared, it is more illuminating to relate deviations from
the target as responses to major shocks. In mid 1932 there was a clear concern of  continued deflation. On
the one hand, Heckscher had suggested that monetary policy could not restore the relationship between
various indices, on the other hand a reflation of wholesale prices was needed, according to Cassel. In June
1932 wholesale prices had fallen by 26 per cent since the end of 1928 while consumer prices had
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decreased 8 per cent during the same period. The consumer price index of the Riksbank had been
relatively stable, after September 1931.
39
A description of the policy dilemma was given by Irving Fisher.
40 He noted that:
"When in May 1932, the Banking Committee of the Riksdag met...the internal wholesale price level
ought to be raised, in so far as this could be done without also seriously affecting the cost of living.
Swedish retail prices and wages had not fallen as drastically as had the wholesale price level, so that the
gap between wholesale and retail prices had become abnormally wide. By raising wholesale prices, while
maintaining the retail price level, it was hoped to correct this disequilibrium. At the same time this
procedure was to make production profitable again".
41
Summing up, the discussion so far underlines the provisional nature of the process during which the
monetary program was drafted between September 1931 and June 1932. While Heckscher recommended
that the Riksbank should stabilize the price level at the existing structure of prices, Cassel argued that the
wholesale price index first had to be raised, closing the gap between wholesale prices and the cost of
living index that had developed 1928-1931, before the Bank began to stabilize prices.
Except for the report by Davidson and Heckscher, we have found no explicit reference to forward-looking
policy rules. Neither were any explicit quantitative inflation forecasts made at the Riksbank.
42 The
intention of the Board of the Riksbank was to endeavor to maintain more or less unaltered the average
level of prices of domestic and consumer goods.  A monetary policy along these lines was compatible
with a certain rise in the Riksbank's index as prices of certain import and export goods were expected to
increase. The Banking Committee then added that even domestic market prices should be allowed to rise,
not just export and import prices, provided this did not appreciably affect the cost of living. This can be
interpreted as a provisional short-term specification of a price stability target which in the long run aims
at price stability. The reason for this interpretation is that wholesale prices since 1928 had fallen much
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more than retail prices. However, the  possibility of raising domestic wholesale prices, without bringing
about an increase in the cost of living, recommended by Cassel and later supported by Fisher, was
questioned by Heckscher.
The idea of a lagged introduction of the new monetary program did not occur in the 1930s. Price
stabilization was to take place at once. As policies emerged the September 1931 price level was adopted
as the starting point although various requests were made in the following years for a rise in the wholesale
price index.
4.5. Who should set the goal of monetary policy?
Modern research on central bank independence draws a distinction between goal independence and
instrument independence.
43 A central bank has goal independence when it is free to set the final goals for
monetary policy (e.g. decide that price stability is less important than output stability), while a bank that
has instrument independence is free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals.
Much suggests that the goal of price stabilization announced in September 1931 acted as an important
restriction on monetary policy, while the Riksbank actually was more interested in maintaining stable
exchange rates than maintaining the internal purchasing power of the krona.
44 The Riksbank was
traditionally an adherent of fixed exchange rates. The monetary policy statement by the Finance Minister
was written and inspired by economists, thus not originating from the Riksbank. The Riksbank tried
already in November 1931 to peg the pound rate, but failed. Again in the Summer of 1933 the Riksbank
pegged the krona to the pound. This time the pegging succeeded. The minutes of the Board of the Bank
demonstrate a strong belief in the beneficial effects of a fixed exchange rate for the krona.
To examine the issue of goal and instrument independence in the 1930s, we focus on the process leading
to the approval of the monetary policy program by the Riksdag. The Riksbank certainly was influential in
the shaping of this program. As shown here the Banking Committee in the Riksdag and the Finance
Minister were more influential, however.
In the report by Heckscher, he discussed whether any constitutional guarantees could be adopted for the
paper standard similar to those once found in the Swedish law pertaining to the gold standard. Heckscher
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was pessimistic about the feasibility of such guarantees since the paper standard lacked those simple
points of references  of the gold standard that made it easy to see if the rules of the system were followed.
Still, Heckscher was of the opinion that attempts ought to be made to anchor the paper standard in the
law, suggesting that in due time it would be possible to find better points of references than those
presently available.
One possible approach would be to legally force the central bank to maintain a stable price level.
However, this approach was probably dangerous to adopt, according to Heckscher, since, first, it would
give constitutional status to the weights of a given price index which would not adjust to continuous
changes in the economy, and, second, one specific price index was in any case an inadequate point of
reference for monetary policy. At best, the law could prescribe some maximum allowable deviations
around a fixed level of a price index or of a combination of price indices. However, at this juncture no
legal regulations should be introduced.
At any rate, the Swedish authorities should publicly declare their firm commitment to the principles of the
new monetary system and preferably also state explicitly that the foreign value of the krona  and the
volume of notes in circulation would be dependent on the aim of the monetary program. Apparently he
viewed such announcement as a substitute for legislation based on the monetary program.  Cassel and
Davidsson did not suggest any judicial changes in order to have binding commitment to the new price
stability norm.
The Banking Committee forcefully reminded the Bank of its goal dependence in May 1932:
"The Committee's starting point is that the broad guidelines for monetary policy are established by the
Government, not by the Governing Board , and that maintaining the convertibility of notes for gold has
accordingly been the guiding principle for the Riksbank's managerial body. ... "
45
The first evaluation of the monetary policy program approved by the Riksdag was accomplished in June
1933. The most important new aspect in the evaluation of the monetary policy program was the following
statement, arguing for giving instrument independence to the Riksbank:
"The Riksbank should be given no directions as to its monetary policy beyond such as indicate the
objectives of that policy. The choice of means for reaching this objective should rest entirely with the
Riksbank, and the Riksbank should be allowed such liberty of action as is required for this purpose. In
regard to public financial demands on the Riksbank, the latter's complete independence should be
maintained."
46
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The monetary policy program finally approved by parliament implied that the Riksbank’s position can be
described as goal dependent but instrument independent.
The goal was covered by the five aspects decided on in May 1932, but the instruments were chosen at the
Riksbank’s discretion as indicated by the aspect added in June 1933. This meant that besides the standard
monetary policy instruments, the Riksbank also intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to
prevent an excessively strong increase in exchange rates and to smooth minor exchange rate movements.
47
4.6. Which instruments and indicators were chosen?
Cassel, Davidson and Heckscher agreed that the monetary policy instruments used by the Riksbank in
order to fulfil the price stability target remained the same as under the gold standard: changes in the
discount rate and operations in the foreign exchange market were the most important instruments. The
explicit announcement of a primary objective for monetary policy would serve as an important moral
suasion instrument in order to maintain confidence in the future value of the krona, as emphasized by
Heckscher.
48
The economists did not mention the use of monetary aggregates such as the monetary base or the money
stock. The three economists  were all working within a monetary framework that should be classified as
Wicksellian. The discount rate was the important tool of monetary policy. Monetary aggregates were not
important as intermediate targets or indicators during this period. Aggregate monetary statistics were
available on a monthly basis as reported in the balance sheets of the commercial banking system and of
the Riksbank. However, little interest was given to these statistics.
Present inflation targeting makes use of a number of indicators including inflation forecasts. As the
monetary program was based on price stabilization various price indices were recommended as indicators
for the Riksbank. Heckscher argued that the index for wholesale prices should be closely monitored as
this index had a tendency to change far in advance of retail prices, thus informing the management of the
Riksbank at an early stage about movements in prices. Retail prices would then show to what extent the
policy measures taken had accomplished the intended effects.
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Here Heckscher argued that movements in wholesale prices should be used for the purpose of making
forecasts for directing monetary policy and that fluctuations in retail prices should be adopted as a
measure of the actual effects of monetary policy - as a "verification" according to his report.
Kjellström presented an index of raw material commodity prices moinitored during this period and stated
that "the Bank of Sweden makes use of wholesale indices published by the commercial banks and the
Royal Board of Trade, as well as the price series relating to raw materials and products to guide its
monetary policy".
49 Since Swedish exports largely consisted of commodities and export prices were
closely monitored, commodity prices undoubtedly played an important role as indictor for monetary policy
during this period.
The foreign exchange rate had a prominent role as a monetary guide during the 1930s. Swedish
economists and policymakers recognized that movements in exchange rates affected prices in an open
economy. However, there was also an insight that given a purposeful Swedish monetary policy, it was to
be expected that the domestic value of the Swedish krona would also determine the foreign exchange
rates.
50
Partly because of an underdeveloped Swedish bond market and the fact that Swedish economists had not
spelled out a theory of the bank rate/long bond spread, this yield was not employed as a policy indicator
during the price stabilization period.
51
Present practice of inflation targeting makes substantial use of forecasts, in particular of the future rate of
inflation. A striking feature of the price level targeting of the 1930s is the lack of explicit forecasts and
prognosis. Why was this the case? Dag Hammarskjöld provided an answer in a lecture on modern central
banking to the Swedish Bankers´ Association in 1935 – at that time he was employed by the Riksbank
working in close contact with Rooth. Hammarskjöld stressed that in the past when Sweden was on gold,
central banking was characterized by the automatic functioning of the gold standard – it displayed the
working patterns of a “machine”. In this institutional setup there was no need for information about the
behavior of the economy.
Under present circumstances it was obvious that central banks needed knowledge “about the domestic
business cycle and the world business cycle”, however. The modern central bank thus should recruit a new
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type of employee, namely that of the economic advisor, in charge of analyzing domestic and international
economic events according to Hammarskjöld (1935, p. 6). He pointed at the Bank of England as a
forerunner in this field.
Hammarskjöld’s lecture gives a reason why the Riksbank did not use any inflation forecasts. The Bank
simply lacked the expertise capable of producing forecasts in the modern sense. The econometric
techniques and the statistical data used presently for inflation forecasting did not exist at the time.
4.7. How was the price level targeting monitored?
To make monetary policy transparent under the inflation target regime that was announced in 1993, the
Riksbank communicates with financial market participants and the public by speeches, inflation reports
and other publications
52. The inflation report is the most important policy document and is published four
times a year. The purpose of the report is to provide a basis for monetary policy decisions and make the
Riksbank's deliberations known to a wider public. The inflation reports contain an account of the inflation
forecast, in terms of both the consumer price index and the underlying rate of inflation, and of monetary
policy as well as an assessment of alternative risk scenarios.
Other important channels for monetary policy communication, besides the inflation reports, are the
speeches by the Governor and Deputy Governors. In addition the Governor appears before the public in
hearings in the Committee on Finance of the Parliament.
In the 1930s, the Riksdag supervised and monitored the activities of the Riksbank, primarily through the
annual report of the Riksbank submitted in early January to the Banking Committee of the Riksdag. Next,
the Governor was questioned by the Banking Committee which submitted a report to the Riksdag in May
for a general debate on the conduct of monetary policy. The Government as well as members of the
Riksdag put forth legislation concerning the policy of the Riksbank. The process was an open one. It was
commented on in the media.
Monetary policy was also evaluated in bills put forth by the government. These bills were drafted within
the Ministry of Finance. The political opposition also proposed legislation concerning the policy of the
Riksbank. The main monitoring of the Riksbank thus occurred through the political process.
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The Riksbank was also continuously monitored in the financial press and by the economics profession.
Cassel, Heckscher and Ohlin among others commented frequently on the program of  price stabilization,
often being critical of the policy of the Riksbank. This criticism was taken seriously by the Riksbank. It
had to pay attention to the views of outsiders as these could be picked up the Government and by
Parliament.
5. Evaluations of the Price Stabilization Program in the 1930s
5.1. Evaluation of the Monetary Policy Program in 1933 and 1937
Aside from the annual examination by the Banking Committee, two major official evaluations of the
monetary program were presented in the 1930s. The first one was carried out in the Spring of 1933.
53 The
Minister of Finance reported on 23 April 1933 the appointment of a group of twelve experts - including
Cassel, Heckscher, Rooth and Jacob Wallenberg, a prominent commercial banker - to consider the
guidelines of Swedish monetary policy. The experts submitted a statement dated 22 May 1933 - as
Riksbank governor, Rooth did not participate. The joint statement, later approved by the Government and
the Riksdag, suggested that Sweden's monetary policy should continue to aim at regulating the internal
purchasing power of the krona.
A change in the internal purchasing power of the krona favorable to Sweden's economy would probably
be most easily and most advantageously accomplished in connection with a rise of the world price level.
Sweden should accordingly make a point of keeping pace with such a development and associate herself
at the World Economic Conference in London with any efforts made to attain that end.
On the other hand, if such a strategy would not be possible, Sweden would have to continue to pursue an
independent monetary policy. In that case the aim should be to arrest any tendency to a fall in prices. In
addition to this, the goal of an independent Swedish monetary policy should be to bring about a moderate
rise of the internal wholesale price level . Such a rise would not have any major effect on retail prices as
they reacted slowly to changes in wholesale prices.
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In conjunction with the experts’ report, the Minister of Finance presented his views on the performance of
the monetary program in a government bill on 26 May 1933. Reviewing the development of various price
indexes since September 1931, he first analysed the Board of Commerce price index. It was 107 for
September 1931, 111 for December 1931, went down in the second quarter of 1932, and was 110 in
September and October 1932, and 105 in April 1933. Second, the Finance Minister noted that the
Riksbank consumer price index had displayed a high degree of stability; it had ranged from 100.1 to
100.8 during 1932; then shown a falling tendency since November 1932 until it was 98.8 in April 1933.
The price level for imported goods rose from 80 in September 1931 to 99 in September/October 1932 on
account of the krona's depreciation. In April 1933 the level had dropped back to 91. The export price
index was 111 in September 1931, 113 in February 1932 and 104 in March 1933. The Finance Minister
concluded:
"The price rise for imported goods was thus countered in the initial period up to the autumn of 1932 by
the price fall for export goods, which had to do with conditions in markets abroad, while home market
prices were virtually unchanged, possibly somewhat below the level that prevailed in September 1931.
Since the autumn of 1932 the price index for all commodity groups has fallen, though in recent months
the decline has been less pronounced. The downward tendency was broken in April but it seems that this
improvement in the price situation has essentially favored home market and export goods, while import
prices continued to fall. The price movements described here show that the fears of a loss of purchasing
power for the krona that were expressed when the gold standard was abandoned have not been confirmed.
On the contrary, the price fall has not entirely ceased, still less has there been the price recovery that was
mentioned in the report for 1932 from the Banking committee."
54
The Minister of Finance went on to note that some industries with a domestic market orientation had
withstood the deepening international depression more successfully than export industries. However,
unemployment had increased.  Trade union unemployment went up from 26.5 per cent in December to
31.0 per cent in December 1932 and to 28.1 per cent in March 1933. (See Chart 5.)
Turning to interest rate movements, the Minister of Finance stressed that the cuts in the discount rate in
1932 had not been fully effective in that the commercial banks only altered the discount rate for
commercial bills. At the turn of 1932, however, the commercial banks had also reduced their lending
rates. When Sweden left the gold standard in the autumn of 1931, the strength of the downward price
effects in the global economy had been underestimated, according to him. Attention was concentrated
solely on preventing an expected bout of inflation. In the spring of 1932 easing of the monetary stance
would suffice for some recovery in prices. The subsequent development showed that, by themselves,
discount rate cuts and easier capital conditions were not sufficient to stimulate a price rise.
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The experts’ report , however, had drawn attention to the fact that the Riksbank did not lack ways of
intervening more actively, which linked up with the alternatives for financing public works to counter
unemployment. Considering what the experts had stated, the Minister was of the opinion that  the
possibilities of exerting an appreciable influence on the domestic price level were no doubt greater
than indicated by the Riksbank's Board of Directors . These opportunities should be utilized to the extent
needed to achieve a moderate increase in the domestic price level.
Finally, the Finance Minister was of the opinion that attention must also be paid to preventing a price rise
above the stated limits. If the downward price tendencies had been underestimated in the autumn of 1931,
there could now be a temptation not to pay sufficient attention to the inflationary tendencies that could be
released by a general upturn in global activity.
In conclusion, the Finance Minister was critical of the policy of the Riksbank. The Bank had not fulfilled
the goal of monetary policy; both wholesale and consumer prices had fallen between September 1931 and
April 1933. The Minister of Finance wanted the Riksbank to intervene “more actively" and to "link", that
is to coordinate, the Riksbank’s policy with the Government´s fiscal policy to combat unemployment.
These formulations reflected the fact that the Finance Minister, Ernst Wigforss, of the Social Democratic
government coming into power in 1932, was inspired by the ideas on fiscal policies promoted by Keynes
in the UK and by Bertil Ohlin and Gunnar Myrdal in Sweden.
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The second evaluation of the monetary policy program was made public in 1937. On 30 April 1937 the
Board of the Riksbank discussed the goal that the Government had set up for the Riksbank's monetary
policy and which the Banking Committee had formulated in 1933. The Board considered the goal as to
achieve an increase in the level of domestic wholesale prices. This rise should be limited so that it did not
affect living costs appreciably. This goal would be achieved most readily in the event of an increase in the
global price level, which would affect the price level in Sweden to the desired extent.
56
The Board of Directors then suggested that a change in the goal was called for because of changing
circumstances. A further increase in the general price level in Sweden did not seem to be desirable. The
Riksbank's policy, like economic policy in general, should now focus on trying to restrain the price rise
and at least prevent an inflationary tendency. The Board thought that, as far as possible, the Riksbank
should maintain the stability of Sweden's currency. Considering that the economic situation is changeable
                                                       
55 Landgren (1960, p.13)
56 Included in Banking Committee, Submission no. 67, 21 May 1937, p.231
at short notice, so that an amendment of the program may be needed, the Board requested that the
directives be formulated in general terms and applied to a limited period.
Simultaneously, the Minister of Finance noted that the depression had given way to a pronounced boom.
The price fall had been succeeded by a price rise that proceeded slowly in the early years within narrow
limits but had accelerated markedly since the preceding autumn, so that wholesale prices were close to the
level before the outbreak of the depression. He stressed that monetary policy should aim for a certain
stability in the price level. But other factors must also be allowed to intrude; monetary policy was to be an
instrument for promoting “the smooth progress of economic activities and providing as much employment
as possible for the nation's productive forces”.
57
Ernst Wigforss also pointed out that the "reflation policy" (eliminating the effects of the preceeding
"deflation") had been the characteristic feature of monetary and exchange rate policy in recent years. The
sterling peg in 1933 was not a departure from the directives; the fixed exchange rate to the pound implied
that the level of Swedish wholesale prices was linked to the slow increase in British wholesale price,
which facilitated "reflation".
58
Furthermore, the basic idea that price stability was the primary objective stood firm but "reflation" was no
longer desirable, according to the Finance Minister. The level of wholesale prices had already risen by
more than the "moderate increase" that had been intended originally. Both the Riksbank's policy and
general economic policy should focus on restricting the price rise, at least preventing an inflationary
tendency. It was then inevitable that the question of stabilizing the external value of the krona must
remain a secondary matter.
59
Concerning monetary policy instruments, the Minister of Finance had pointed out that the Riksbank's
primary instrument was the discount rate on bills of exchange. An increase in this rate was likely to be
effective only if it was supported by open market operations, perhaps together with an increase in
minimum reserves. As an emergency precaution, the Riksdag had authorized the National Debt Office to
provide the Riksbank with Treasury bills or other debt instruments for market operations.
60
The Minister then noted that the price rise was due to three factors: agricultural policy, external price
increases and increased domestic demand. Agricultural policy was a special case, deliberately constructed
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by the Government to raise the price level for agricultural products. Increased food prices accounted for
the largest part of the increase in living costs above the 1931 level.
61
The Minister had considered, in keeping with the program that the Banking Committee had submitted to
the Riksdag in 1933, that the Riksbank's Board of Directors should decide which instruments were to be
used to fulfil the monetary policy goal which the Government had established. This applied under the self-
evident condition that all the various governmental measures that affected the economy and the monetary
system were coordinated so that they supported and did not counteract each other.
62
The Banking Committee adopted most of the views of the Minister of Finance, adding that it was
desirable to keep domestic interest rates as low as possible in the given situation.
63
In conclusion, with the adoption of the bill in May 1937, the primary goal of Swedish monetary policy
again was framed as maintaining a stable price level. However, this was not the only goal set up for the
Riksbank since other goals were mentioned including a stable economy and full employment of the
country’s productive resources. As these objectives might conflict with maintenance of a stable price
level, they presumably were secondary considerations.
64 However, the government stressed the necessity
of synchronizing economic and monetary measures and stated that the Riksbank, in choosing the means to
accomplish its policy, should act in cooperation with the government, that is coordinate its measures with
fiscal policy.
The ideas expressed by the Minister of Finance and by the Banking committee in 1937 should properly be
seen as a forerunner of  the type of stabilization policy implemented in Sweden after World War II. Thus
in 1937, when the Swedish monetary program had become a complete economic program for the country,
this marked not the end of the price stability norm of the 1930s but rather the beginning of the end.
5.2. Evaluation by Economists
The policy of the Riksbank was closely followed, commented on and criticized by the economics
profession. Initially, that is in the Fall of 1931, they were all in favor of the monetary program of 1931,
although they did not share exactly the same view. Eventually, the economists split up into two groups,
one favorable towards price stabilization, one critical of the monetary program.




64 This is also the opinion by Lester (1939, p. 238)33
The first group consisted of the older generation of economists, influenced by the monetary events of
World War I. They were liberal in their general outlook and critical of government intervention. Cassel,
Heckscher and Lindahl belonged to this group. They remained throughout the 1930s proponents of price
stabilization and turned into critics of the new ideas of the younger generation.
The second group was made up of the new generation of economists that was making its way in the
1930s. They were influenced by the high and persistent unemployment of the 1930s. To them the
challenge was to develop theories and policies to reduce unemployment and the fluctuations of the
business cycle. They became early proponents of government intervention and “active” countercyclical
policies. This group was later termed the Stockholm School.
65
Bertil Ohlin and Gunnar Myrdal were the most prominent members of the Stockholm School. Gunnar
Myrdal prepared a report for Ernst Wigforss giving the theoretical foundations of a countercyclical fiscal
policy in 1933. Ohlin suggested at an early stage various government measures to counteract
unemployment. In December 1933 he reviewed the policy of the Riksbank in an article with the title “The
Inadequacy of Price Stabilization”. Here Ohlin was of the opinion that the Riksbank had failed in
preventing a fall of wholesale and consumer prices. In addition, the price stabilization program had not
prevented a decline in demand, in production, in real national income and in domestic investment
according to Ohlin (1933). According to him:
“on the whole, then, we may say that, when once a depression has set in, a reduction in the quantities
produced and marketed can very easily take place without being materially reflected in the index numbers
presenting the average wholesale or retail price level.”
On the other hand, Ohlin (1933, p. 264) thought that the monetary program had been beneficial to
Sweden by preventing a further decline in prices. “The fatal spiral of deflation was avoided in Sweden.”
However, in his conclusions Ohlin thought price stabilization was insufficient. Instead, he recommended
a “konjunkturpolitik” that aims at as full and regular utilization of the productive forces as possible,”.
Ohlin thus proposed employment stabilization rather than price stabilization. Here Ohlin was
recommending a stabilization policy program that eventually spelt the end of the monetary program.
6. Conclusions
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economists in the 1930s is dealt with in the introduction of Jonung (1992). Cassel’s and Heckscher´s
resistance towards “the new economics” is examined by Carlson (1992).34
When Sweden left the gold standard in the fall of 1931, the government, under the influence of the
economics profession, introduced a monetary program of stabilization of the domestic price level. It was
launched at the onset of the depression, initially to arrest the fall in prices as well as mitigating wide-
spread fears of rising prices. The monetary declaration of 1931, consisting of one sentence, evolved in
several steps into a full monetary program before it was finally approved by the Parliament in 1932.
The Swedish experience of the 1930s anticipated much of present discussion of monetary policy for
central banks with price stability as the primary objective. The Swedish policymakers took aboard the
idea, familiar from inflation targeting countries today, that an institutional commitment to price stability
could act as a coordinating device and anchor expectations. The announcement of the monetary program
in 1931-32, initially viewed as a temporary one, acquired the character of guidelines for a monetary
policy, acting as a nominal anchor intending to calm the fears of inflation.
The transparency of the monetary policy strategy in the 1930s through communication with the Swedish
public can be seen as anticipating the modern view on inflation targeting. The Riksdag and its Banking
Committee supervised and monitored the activities of the Riksbank through regular reports. The Governor
was questioned annually by the Banking Committee. Monetary policy was evaluated in bills put forth by
the government. The main monitoring of the Riksbank occurred through an open political process which
was well covered by the press. Two major evaluations of the monetary program were carried out, in 1933
and 1937, in addition to the annual examinations of the Banking Committee.
Central banks pursuing an inflation target today have all announced a numerical target for inflation. The
Riksbank published from 1931 and onwards a consumer price index as part of the monetary policy
process. However, the consumer price index was not the sole target variable. The Riksbank monitored
other price indices as well. Nevertheless, it was concerned with ”underlying inflation” in a modern way,
as it stressed the need to disregard temporary factors, like indirect taxes, customs duties and seasonal
effects, influencing the development of inflation.
The price stability target adopted by the Riksbank in 1931-32 was a price level target, in contrast to the
inflation targets adopted by several central banks in the 1990s. With a price level target the longer-term
variance, and hence uncertainty, about prices are smaller. According to one prominent observer, the chief
disadvantage of a price level target is that the monetary authority is attempting to deflate the economy half
the time, thus creating more uncertainty about short-term inflation rates than with an inflation target.
66
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However, in a model with persistence in output (due to price-stickiness, for instance), price level targeting
results in lower short-run inflation variability than inflation targeting.
67
In 1932 the fears of inflation expressed when Sweden left the gold standard was replaced by a clear
concern of continued deflation. The strength of the downward price effects in the global economy had
probably been underestimated. By raising wholesale prices, while maintaining the retail price level, it was
hoped to correct the disequilibrium between wholesale prices and the cost of living index that had
developed 1928-1931, before the Bank began to stabilize prices. Although continued deflation should be
resisted just as strongly as inflation, some recovery in prices was desirable, though not a return to a
”unduly distant” price level. This part of the program was successfully implemented. In 1937 wholesale
prices were close to the level at the end of 1928, while the consumer price index had been relatively stable
since 1931. This suggests that the price level target contributed to a low variability of consumer prices
during the recovery from the depression. An important lesson from the early Swedish experience is also
that a price stability target can be used to  raise inflation expectations when there are fears of deflation.
What was overlooked in the Swedish experiment with price-level targeting? According to the modern
view on monetary policy, there is a considerable lag before monetary measures affect inflation. For this
reason, monetary policy has to be forward-looking. In particular, the assessment of future inflation will be
central. In practice, the part played by the inflation forecast is so vital that it resembles an intermediate
target for inflation targeting central banks, see King (1994) and Svensson (1997). Central banks should
pursue monetary policy so that the inflation forecast for an appropriate horizon is in line with the inflation
target.
In contrast, we have not found any references to explicit forward looking policy rules used in the 1930s by
the Riksbank. Some of the Swedish economists were insightful as to the use of forecasts, but in practice it
seems as if the Riksbank and its principals were primarily concerned with the actual price level. The lack
of any expertise on forecasting within the Riksbank may account for this state of affairs.
The monetary program adopted in 1931-1932 can be seen as a means to set a price-level target for a goal-
dependent but instrument-independent central bank. The Riksdag stressed that the Riksbank should be
given no directions as to its monetary policy beyond such as indicated by the objective of that policy.
However, the program was not given a legal backing. Even though the original goal of stable prices was
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maintained throughout the 1930s, adjustments and additional goals were added by requests from the
Parliament and the Minister of Finance as the depression worsened. In 1932 the goal to preserve the
domestic purchasing power of the krona was adjusted as both import prices and domestic market prices
were allowed to increase. The Riksbank was also asked to keep interest rates as low as possible without
jeopardizing the monetary policy objective. In 1933 the Riksbank was asked to ”intervene more actively”
and ”link” its monetary policy measures with fiscal policy measures to combat unemployment. In 1937
the Riksbank, in addition to the primary target to preserve a stable price level, was given other goals like
aiming for full employment.
The monetary program of 1931-32 was developed in a pre-Keynesian world where the dominating view
held that monetary policy was effective in influencing the movement of prices. The depression that started
in Sweden in 1930 and reached its trough in 1932-33 opened for a new view concerning the role of fiscal
policies. The government budget was openly underbalanced and requests were made that monetary and
fiscal polices should be coordinated. Price level targeting was considered necessary but not sufficient to
bring Sweden out of the depression. The monetary program was viewed as arresting the deflationary
process but not as adequate in raising production and employment. Instead, monetary policy should be
coordinated with fiscal policy to stabilize the macroeconomy. This view eventually spelled the demise of
price level targeting and the subordination of monetary policy. It became the victim of price control policy
and “keynesianism” in the post World War II-period.37
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Appendix A.
Table A1. The Questionnaire of the Riksbank of October 1931.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. A. Under which international conditions would it be appropriate for the Swedish monetary system to be
tied to monetary conditions in other countries.
B. Which arguments can be advanced for tying the krona
1) to an international currency, primarily to a gold standard, and
2) to a given foreign currency?
C. Which should be the basic conditions for a transition or return to such a system? Should the exchange
rate of the krona be set equal to the old parity to gold, or to a given foreign currency, as for example the
pound, or to some other rate, more recently attained?
D. Should such a transition be instituted as a temporary step, subject to possible changes, or should it
come about in a single once-and-for-all reform?
E. Which norms should guide the discount policy and the foreign exchange policy of  the Riksbank in lieu
of such a transition or return?
F. How should domestic price stability be realized under present circumstances? Should the goal of price
stabilization be expressed in terms of wholesale or retail prices or in terms of the cost of living, in import
and/or export prices, or in still some other way?
II. Which means are available to the Riksbank  to accomplish
a) a transition to
b) and preservation of the proposed system?
Is there a need for any powers that the Riksbank
a) presently lacks or
b) presently does not use?
III.  Which other questions should preferably be considered in connection with the future organization of
the Swedish monetary system?44




Sweden returns to the gold standard at  the prewar dollar parity  April 1924
Great Britain returns to gold  April 1925
Bank of England leaves the gold standard 21-9-1931
The Riksbank requests the Government to relieve it from the
requirement to convert its notes into gold at demand
following a week of large gold and capital outflows 28-9-1931
The Riksbank seeks the advice of Cassel, Davidson and Heckscher  8-10-1931
The Riksbank fails to peg the Krona to the pound at the gold
parity rate of 18:15             November 1931
The death of Ivar Kreuger in Paris sets of liquidity crises for the
Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget.      March 1932
The Riksbank supports the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget
with a loan of 200 million kronor
The Parliament adopts a full fledged monetary program May 1932
An expert groups reports on Swedish monetary policy  May 1933
supporting price stabilization
The Riksbank pegs unofficially the krona to the pound
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